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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Patent valuation is a complex, occasionally confusing concept that has 
become somewhat of a gray area in intellectual property.  Patent value is “the 
economic benefit that the patent can bestow upon its owner.”1  It involves 
determining a patent’s monetary value to the patent’s owner, which can prove 
difficult based on the fact that patents are inherently unique.2  Generally, the 
more significance a patent has to society, the higher its value.3  There are 
currently seven different valuation methods used for valuing intellectual 
property.4  They include the following: the twenty-five (25) Percent Rule, 
Industry Standards, Ranking, Surrogate Measures, Disaggregation Methods, 
the Monte Carlo Method, and Option Methods.5  While these are all widely 
used methods, none of them are definitive, and they are continually being 
updated.6  In fact, the Federal Circuit recently held that the twenty-five (25) 
Percent Rule is flawed, and it would no longer be accepting evidence using that 
method.7   
 
1. Michael S. Kramer, Valuation and Assessment of Patents and Patent Portfolios Through 
Analytical Techniques, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 463, 465 (2007). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 466. 
4. Ted Hagelin, Valuation of Intellectual Property Assets: An Overview, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
1133, 1134 (2002).  
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 1139–40. 
7. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
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On the opposite end of this valuation spectrum is determining when a patent 
has no value and has become worthless or obsolete.8  Patents are generally 
granted for a seventeen-year period, and throughout the life of a patent, the 
patent holder can take tax deductions for things such as amortization or normal 
wear and tear.9  Tax deductions can also be taken for patent obsolescence or 
“worthlessness.”10  If the patent becomes worthless before its expiration year, 
the unrecovered cost may be deducted in that year.11  However, there have not 
been many case discussions on what determines when a patent is “worthless” 
or when exactly a patent has become obsolete for purpose of these tax 
deductions.  According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, obsolescence is 
“the process of becoming obsolete or the condition of being nearly obsolete 
. . . .”12  While this definition is easy enough for most to understand, albeit 
somewhat obvious, it does nothing to further the question of when a patent has 
reached that point.  Much of the same can be said for the case law surrounding 
the topic, which is the crux of the problem.   
The most recent cases discussing patent obsolescence can be sourced back 
to the 1920s and 1930s with Tennessee Fibre Co. v. C.I.R. and Hazeltine Corp. 
v. C.I.R.  These cases came about during the height of the “paper patent” 
doctrine, which differentiated patents based on whether or not they had ever 
been put to use.13  The outcomes of these cases reflected the times.  Both the 
Tennessee Fibre Co. and Hazeltine decisions rested on the actual use of the 
patent in determining its value.14   
This comment considers a key question: what is the correct method for 
determining patent worthlessness or obsolescence?  Is it the method used 
almost a century ago?  Part II of this comment will delve into the paper patent 
doctrine and its effect on the question.  Part III will further look at how this 
paper patent approach has been applied toward evaluating patents.  In contrast, 
Part IV will look into the approach that has more recently been applied.  This 
newer method involves a two-prong test of subjective and objective factors.15  
Finally, in Part V, this Comment will conclude by assessing what is the correct 
 
8. It should be noted, throughout this comment these terms may be used interchangeably, seeing 
that much of the case law uses “worthlessness” when talking about obsolescence. 
9. Mertens Law of Federal Income Taxation, 22C:31 Depreciation of Patents, Westlaw. 
10. Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)–9. 
11. Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)–6(a). 
12. Obsolescence, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/obsolescence. 
13. John F. Duffy, Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1359, 1360 
(2013). 
14. Tenn. Fibre Co. v. C.I.R., 15 B.T.A. 133, 140 (B.T.A. 1929); Hazeltine Corp. v. C.I.R., 89 
F.2d 513, 521–22 (3d Cir. 1937). 
15. Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. C.I.R., T.C. Summ.Op. 2003-19, *6 (2003). 
SUMER_FINAL_MACROED (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/20  12:26 PM 
2020] PATENT WORTHLESSNESS FOR TAX PURPOSES 95 
 
approach that should be used when discussing patent worthlessness.  Because 
of the definitiveness of the newer test, it should be the chosen method for 
determining when a patent becomes worthless.  
   II.  THE “PAPER PATENT” ERA 
Until the 1950s, the “paper patent” doctrine was an integral part of 
intellectual property.16 As previously mentioned, this doctrine correlated to 
patent use.17  Courts distinguished patents on whether or not the patent was 
actually used.18  Those that were not used were referred to as “paper patents,” 
and courts were more inclined to hold them invalid.19  Though its importance 
remained somewhat relevant until the early 1980s, it completely died with the 
creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982.20  There was no definitive explanation 
given for the shift, but an important question had arisen during the doctrine’s 
heyday, which looked at why a patent’s nonuse was considered an unfavorable 
factor.21  The problem this posed is what eventually led to  all patents being 
held in equal light regardless of their use.22   
Though there was no explicit explanation given for the end of the paper 
patent era, one source of its demise was the emergence and domination of the  
“documentary disclosure” theory.23  This theory stands for the fact that the only 
statutory disclosure required for patents is set forth in the patent document.24  It 
is “the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.”25  Therefore, it is a paper disclosure 
set by a minimal standard.26  Because the only requirement for patents is this 
paper disclosure, there is to be no discrimination against paper patents.27   
Furthermore, today’s modern patent lawyers believe inventions can come 
about by two ways: through “actual reduction to practice” or “constructive 
reduction to practice.”28  An actual reduction to practice means the patent 
application can actually work in the real world.29  A constructive reduction to 
 
16. See Duffy, supra note 13, at 1360.  
17. Id. 
18. Id.  
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 1388.  
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 1361. 
24. Id. 
25. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (quoting 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)) (emphasis added). 
26. Duffy, supra note 13, at 1362. 
27. Id. at 1364.  
28. Id. at 1366. 
29. Id. 
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practice means the invention of the patent itself need not have actually been 
tested prior to being patented.30  The only requirement is that it could work if it 
were actually built.31  This latter theory is somewhat in conflict with the paper 
patent doctrine, and its acceptance by modern patent lawyers helps clarify why 
the paper patent doctrine is no longer in use.   
The influence of the paper patent doctrine in the first half of the twentieth 
century was widespread in intellectual property.  This explains why much of 
the litigation of patents occurred during this time, and it also explains why the 
holdings in those cases turned out the way they did.  This comment will now 
look at these cases in more depth to see the repercussions this standard had.   
     III.  THE PAPER PATENT ERA’S INFLUENCE ON PATENT WORTHLESSNESS 
The first such case involving the paper patent’s influence on patent 
worthlessness was Tennessee Fibre Co. v. C.I.R.  In this case, the petitioner 
held a patent for a process that separated the cotton fiber from its seeds, with 
the byproduct being bleached.32  This process and its resultant product became 
very useful for gun cotton, and it was sold exclusively to munitions 
manufacturers throughout the early  1910s.33 However, the petitioner’s success 
changed after the end of World War I in 1918.34  With no more weapons needed 
to supply a war, there was no longer any demand for the product, and the 
petitioner determined the patent to be valueless.35  On his income taxes for 
1918, he claimed a deduction for obsolescence, which was disallowed by the 
Service.36   
The petitioner argued that under IRC section 234(a), now IRC section 
16737, he could take an obsolescence deduction.38  On review, the Board of Tax 
Appeals agreed with the petitioner that there was no longer any use for the 
patent because the market it served was completely wiped out,39 
notwithstanding the fact that unbeknownst to everyone involved in the case  
World War II would open that market back up in a few years. The court did, 
 
30. Id.  
31. Id. 
32. Tenn. Fibre Co. v. C.I.R., 15 B.T.A. 133, 134 (B.T.A. 1929). 
33. Id. at 135. 
34. Id. at 138. 
35. Id.  
36. Id. 
37. Major tax code updates, notably in 1954 and 1986, changed code sections. Substantive 
changes were made, but sometimes, as the case here, there were only changes with reference to the 
specific code number. 
38. Id. at 138–39. 
39. Id. at 140. 
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however, rule against the petitioner because he had not abandoned the patent.40  
He continually put money into it, trying to find a use for it, and the court focused 
on this in determining the patent was not completely obsolete.41  This focus on 
the patent’s use was the tipping point in the court’s analysis.42   
The next case to come about in the paper patent era was the aforementioned 
Hazeltine case, which involved a patent for the composition of radio receivers.43  
The petitioner, in determining that the patents became obsolete as a result of 
new technology, took a large depreciation deduction on his company’s income 
tax return for the year.44  The Commissioner originally disallowed the 
depreciation taken, reasoning that the depreciation should have been amortized 
over a longer period of time because the life of the patent was not over.45  
However, upon review, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the 
petitioner, holding that patent obsolescence related to use.46  The patents here 
were obsolete because “they had gone completely out of use and no longer had 
any practical commercial value.”47  In reaching this conclusion, the court made 
a distinction between obsolescence and complete obsoleteness: 
It is of course true that the Neutrodyne circuit continued capable after 
1930, of performing, for those who still desired to use it, the same 
function in radio reception which it had theretofore performed, and it 
may well be that a few persons did continue to use it after that time.  
This, however, is far from saying that it was not obsolescent so far as 
practical commercial use or public acceptance was concerned, since, as 
we have seen, all the evidence bearing on the question indicates that it 
was substantially out of all commercial use by the end of that year.48   
The issue with both Tennessee Fibre Co. and Hazeltine is that they employ 
an arbitrary use standard influenced by the paper patent era.  Critics of the 
“paper patent49  Both cases support the critics.  As previously mentioned, World 
War II would open the market back up for gun ammunitions in a few years, but 





43. Hazeltine Corp. v. C.I.R., 89 F.2d 513, 515 (3d Cir. 1937). 
44. Id. at 517. 
45. Id. at 521. 
46. Id. at 521–22. 
47. Id. at 521. 
48. Id. at 522. 
49. Duffy, supra note 13, at 1360–61 (quoting Frank B. Killian & Co. v. Allied Latex Corp., 
188 F.2d 940, 942 (2d Cir. 1951).  
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patent at that particular moment in time, the petitioner could have called his 
patent worthless had he not still been trying to find a use for it.50  What would 
have happened, then, to his patent at the start of World War II?  Could the 
petitioner have attempted to use it again?  While there was not follow-up to this 
case discussing the petitioner’s luck with the patent during the second world 
war, there may be an issue with a taxpayer using a patent that he already 
claimed on his tax returns to be worthless.   
This scenario would certainly call into question the application of the tax 
benefit rule.  This concept requires a taxpayer to include in his gross income 
the amount that was previously deducted if “the later event is indeed 
fundamentally inconsistent with the premise on which the deduction was 
initially based.”51  Its premise relies on maintaining balance.52  It remedies the 
situation “when an apparently proper expense turns out to be improper.”53  The 
tax benefit rule applies to a variety of tax situations, including those regarding 
corporate dividends, ordinary and necessary business expenses, and the amount 
of damages correctly included in a taxpayer’s gross income. 54  
Though the taxpayer may simply have to later include this amount in his 
federal income taxes, there is another issue posed on how many times the 
taxpayer could do this.  For instance, a taxpayer may find it beneficial to 
structure his tax returns by taking the obsolescence deductions in years where 
he has greater income and then later paying the deducted amount on his income 
tax return the next year when it would not cause as big of a financial hit.  This 
potential abuse of the tax code points out the problems with the court’s decision 
to call the patent worthless for tax purposes based on pure speculation.  There 
was no way the court could have known World War II would break out shortly 
thereafter, and perhaps another test employed would still reach the same 
conclusion that court came to, but the nature of the court’s “use” test leaves it 
with more opportunity to get the outcome wrong and cause confusion later on.   
These same issues can be seen with the Hazeltine case.  The court also held 
in that case that new technology made the patent worthless and capable of the 
obsolescence deduction, but there was not enough of a discussion on why that 
was so, with the only reason given being that newer technology had been 
developed that was presumptively better than the petitioner’s.55  In the 21st 
century, technology is constantly evolving.  If newer technology means that all 
 
50. Tenn. Fibre Co. v. C.I.R., 15 B.T.A. 133, 140 (B.T.A. 1929). 
51. Hillsboro Nat. Bank v. C.I.R., 460 U.S. 370, 383 (1983).  
52. Id. at 389 n.24. 
53. Id. at 389 n.24. 
54. Id. at 392; Byrd v. C.I.R., 1987 WL 38627, at *1 (1987); Citigroup, Inc. v. United States, 
140 Fed. Cl. 283, 284–85 (2018).  
55. Hazeltine Corp. v. C.I.R., 89 F.2d 513, 521 (3d Cir. 1937). 
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previous technological advancements are rendered obsolete, then the Service is 
going to see an influx of these worthlessness deductions being claimed.  A 
purely subjective determination on use will, again, result in potential issues 
arising later on.  While it is possible that the same conclusion and issues may 
arise with another test, that overlap should still be less likely.  It is also 
important to consider whether this test is simply a way for taxpayers to make 
money quickly by way of tax breaks rather than based on actual need.   
Issues with these two cases were indirectly discussed in Western States 
Machine Co. v. S.S. Hepworth Co., one of the first cases that marked the end of 
the paper patent era.56  This was a patent infringement case involving sugar 
centrifuges, with the plaintiff alleging that the defendant infringed on his earlier 
ideas.57  There had been a twenty-one year gap between the patents, and despite 
the first patent’s nonuse and making “no impression on the art,” the court held 
that irrelevant.58  Judge Learned Hand, a strong critic of the paper patent 
doctrine, expressed his belief that an unused patent should in no way negatively 
impact the way the case was decided: 
A patent may have lain for years unheeded, as little contribution to the 
sum of knowledge as though it had never existed, an idle gesture long 
since drifted into oblivion.  Nevertheless, it will be as effective to 
invalidate a new patent, as though it had entered into the very life blood 
of the industry.59   
The opinion further called the term “paper patent” merely rhetoric, and held 
for the plaintiff.60  As seen in the case, the use standard was not a good enough 
test for a patent infringement case, so it is difficult to conceive why it should 
be good enough for determining patent worthlessness.  The criticism of the 
paper patent doctrine and the rejection of the nonuse standard in this case 
played a big part in its decline.61  
    IV.  THE NEWER TAX APPROACH 
The shortcomings of the paper patent doctrine’s use standard has left an 
opening for a different standard to be explored.  As readily seen, the cases 
discussed in this section occurred after the end of the paper patent doctrine in 
the 1980s, so they were of the time when there was still not an adequate 
 
56. Duffy, supra note 13, at 1383.  
57. W. States Mach. Co. v. S.S. Hepworth Co., 147 F.2d 345, 346 (2d Cir. 1945).  
58. Id. at 350. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Duffy, supra note 13, at 1383. 
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standard.  The newer tax approach that has been employed leaves much less 
room for guesswork resulting from the arbitrary, subjective tests previously 
employed by the courts.  The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and the Treasury 
Regulations are clear that a taxpayer can take tax deductions for obsolescence.62  
IRC § 167 codifies this right by stating “exhaustion, wear and tear, and 
obsolescence are to be allowed…”63  Its accompanying treasury regulation 
covers what obsolescence means in further detail: 
The depreciation allowance includes an allowance for normal 
obsolescence which should be taken into account to the extent that the 
expected useful life of property will be shortened by reason thereof.  
Obsolescence may render an asset economically useless to the taxpayer 
regardless of its physical condition.  Obsolescence is attributable to 
many causes, including technological improvements and reasonably 
foreseeable economic changes.  Among these causes are normal 
progress of the arts and sciences, supersession or inadequacy brought 
about by developments in the industry, products, methods, markets, 
sources of supply, and other like changes, and legislative or regulatory 
action.  In any case in which the taxpayer shows that the estimated 
useful life previously used should be shortened by reason of 
obsolescence greater than had been assumed in computing such 
estimated useful life, a change to a new and shorter estimated useful life 
computed in accordance with such showing will be permitted.  No such 
change will be permitted merely because in the unsupported opinion of 
the taxpayer the property may become obsolete.64   
There have not been any cases specifically involving patents that have used 
this regulation’s guidance.  That particular application has, unfortunately, not 
yet come up.  However, there have been cases involving intangible assets.65  
These cases have expanded on what a showing of worthlessness requires.   
One of the first of the case discussions occurred in Echols v. C.I.R. The 
intangible assets involved were interests in a partnership that the taxpayers 
claimed became worthless.66  It is here that the court developed the test for 
 
62. I.R.C. 167(c); Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)–9; Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)–6(a). 
63. I.R.C. 167(c). 
64. Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)–9. 
65. Echols v. C.I.R., 935 F.2d 703, 704–05 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying obsolescence to 
partnership interests); Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. C.I.R., T.C. Summ. Op. 2003–19, *4 (2003) 
(applying obsolescence to covenants not to compete); In re Steffen, 305 B.R. 369, 373 (Bkrtcy. M.D. 
Fla. 2004) (applying obsolescence to stocks).  
66. Echols, 935 F.2d at 704. 
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determining worthlessness.67  The court noted that it is clear that property 
cannot be treated as worthless if it has substantial value, but the issue of when 
the property loses its value for tax purposes “is, like beauty, largely in the 
eyes…of the beholder.”68  To solve that, the court implemented a test that 
involved a subjective determination on the part of the taxpayer coupled with an 
objective event.69  The court was careful to espouse the different standards for 
determining abandonment of an intangible asset and the worthlessness of that 
asset, thus indicating the two are separate concepts.70  Making the standard 
clear, the court applied the test to the intangible assets: 
Emphasizing again that the asset being tested for worthlessness is not 
the Land but the Taxpayers’ 75% interest in the Partnership which 
owned the Land, we must determine subjectively just when it was that 
the Taxpayers deemed their Partnership interest worthless, then 
determine objectively whether that interest was valueless at such time.71   
After applying the test, the court held for the taxpayer.72  Shortly after this 
decision, the Fifth Circuit defended the validity of its test when asked by the 
Commissioner to reconsider its treatment of worthlessness.73  The Court 
reiterated the test and further stated the objective part should be an “identifiable 
event” or completed transaction.74  The Court left the latter requirement broad, 
indicating that it does not have to be a property transaction or even include the 
asset in question.75  
This test was further honed in Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. C.I.R. The 
intangible assets involved were covenants not to compete in logging contracts 
entered into by the petitioner.76  After a logging injunction was issued in 
Arizona to protect an endangered species, the petitioner deducted the value of 
three covenants not to compete.77  To assess the validity of the deductions, the 
Court, following Echols, stated the evaluation of worthlessness was a two-
pronged test.78  In the first prong, the Court is to determine whether the taxpayer 
 
67. Id. at 707. 
68. Id.  
69. Id.  
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 709. 
73. Echols v. C.I.R., 950 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1991). 
74. Id. at 211. 
75. Id. 
76. Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. C.I.R., T.C. Summ.Op. 2003–19, *1 (2003). 
77. Id. at *1–2.  
78. Id. at *4. 
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“made a subjective determination that the asset in question was worthless in the 
tax year in question.”79  Here, the taxpayer satisfied the first prong by showing 
that the logging industry in the area had collapsed, resulting in him reporting 
unamortized amounts as a loss on his corporate tax returns.80  In the second 
prong, the taxpayer must show an identifiable event “evidencing the destruction 
of an asset’s value.”81  Like the regulations stated, if there was a reasonable 
possibility that the asset will have a future value, the second prong of the test 
fails.82  The identifiable event here was a statewide logging ban, thus making it 
impossible for the covenantees to compete and ensuring that the asset could not 
possibly have any future value.83   
The identifiable event of the second prong takes more than a mere decline 
in the asset’s value.84  It would take something such as formal bankruptcy or 
market conditions to satisfy it.85  Until the “last vestige of value has 
disappeared,” a worthlessness deduction cannot be taken.86  This test is also not 
satisfied just because something, such as a partnership, is not properly 
managed.87   
It is clear that the case law in this area is plentiful and at the point where 
the test has been adequately defined with enough variations to cover a wide 
variety of situations.  Though it has not been applied to any patents, it has been 
applied to many intangible assets. Because patents are considered intangible 
assets, there is no discernable reason why this area could not expand to include 
patents.   
V.  WHICH STANDARD IS BEST FOR PATENTS? 
The use standard of the paper patent era has already been hit with much 
criticism, which contributed to its decline.88  This criticism stemmed from a 
 
79. Id. at *5. 
80. Id. at *6.  
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id.  
84. Forlizzo v. C.I.R., T.C. Memo 2018-137, *3 (2018) (holding that a taxpayer could not take 
an obsolescence deduction for his interest in real estate development partnerships because of a failure 
to show a closed and completed transaction). 
85. Id. 
86. In re Steffen, 305 B.R. 369, 375 (Bkrtcy. M.D. Fla. 2004).  
87. Lebow v. C.I.R., T.C. Memo. 1995-333, *4–5 (1995) (holding that just because petitioner 
could not secure any information or distributions from partnership did not mean that his interest in it 
was worthless).  
88. W. States Mach. Co. v. S.S. Hepworth Co.,147 F.2d 345, 350 (2d Cir. 1945); Frank B. 
Killian & Co. v. Allied Latex Corp, 188 F.2d 940, 942 (2d Cir. 1950) (holding that the paper patent 
doctrine is merely “rhetoric” and a “meaningless platitude”); Siegel v. Watson, 267 F.2d 621, 624 
(D.C. Cir. 1959).  
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fundamental flaw with the doctrine that could not be squared.  In his analysis 
of the paper patent doctrine, John Duffy summed up its issues as follows:  
Criticism from famous judges, especially Learned Hand, was clearly a 
significant factor in the doctrine’s decline, but such prominent criticism 
was only part of the story.  The more general problem was that the 
doctrine never had a rigorous theoretical justification.  It was an 
intuition…one that could not be grounded in the basic purposes of the 
patent system as they were understood in the latter half of the twentieth 
century.  The absence of that theoretical justification led to the 
decline.89  
Duffy’s criticism is spot on.  There is no actual justification for why there 
should be an arbitrary use standard.  As mentioned, modern patent lawyers 
believe in the concept of “constructive reduction to practice.”90  A patent just 
has to be capable of working, but the patentee need not have actually built in or 
used it in the real world.91  These patents are every bit as good as those covered 
by the concept of “actual reduction to practice,” i.e. those that are actually used 
in the real world.92  Even the courts have fully embraced this concept.93  Since 
the use standard of the paper patent era has been rejected, applying it to patent 
worthlessness or obsolescence seems futile.   
Compared to the use test that stems from the paper patent doctrine, the two-
prong test that came about in Echols is much clearer.  It takes into account not 
only the petitioner’s subjective belief that a patent is obsolete but it also requires 
an objective determination, guided by some event, that a court can use to make 
an informed decision.94  A clear test will provide guidance and ensure there will 
be equal treatment for all cases as opposed to varying conclusions courts could 
reach when applying a different, broader standard.  Additionally, this test makes 
the tax code and treasury regulations less likely to be abused.  As stated in the 
follow-up opinion in Echols, a taxpayer cannot “arbitrarily deduct a loss in any 
year he chooses.”95  There has to be some objective support for that 
determination.96   
 
89. Duffy, supra note 13, at 1383. 
90. Id. at 1366.  
91. Id. 
92. Id. (quoting Lisa A. Dolak, Patents Without Paper: Proving a Date of Invention with 
Electronic Evidence, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 471, 491–92 (1999)).  
93. Duffy, supra note 13, at 1371.  
94. Echols v. C.I.R., 935 F.2d 703, 707 (5th Cir. 1991). 
95. Echols v. C.I.R., 950 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1991).  
96. Id. 
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Had this test been around when the Hazeltine case was decided, it is likely 
that the outcome would have been different.  A court today could conclude that 
the facts of that case did not satisfy the second prong because there was neither 
an identifiable, objective event evidencing obsolescence nor, as the court in In 
re Steffen put it, had the “last vestige of value” of the patent disappeared.97  
    VI.  CONCLUSION 
Though there have not been many worthlessness or obsolescence cases 
regarding patents in the last eighty years or so, it is still important to look at this 
area of case law because of the different reasoning the courts have used to reach 
decisions.  The cases on patent obsolescence from the paper patent era are still 
considered good law, so a determination needs to be made if future patent 
obsolescence cases should follow their logic.  This comment’s assessment of 
that era’s reasoning concludes future cases should not.  The reasoning of those 
cases was too broad and had no uniform justification on how decisions were 
reached.   
The approach that should be followed is the most recent test employed, 
which is not a product of the paper patent era. It provides a clearer standard for 
courts to use that will be subject to less abuse.  By giving the taxpayer his 
subjective say in the matter and checking that by an objective event the court 
can look to, it provides the fairest result.  Additionally, there is less of a chance 




97. In re Steffen, 305 B.R. 369, 375 (Bkrtcy. M.D. Fla. 2004). 
